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We demonstrate a quantum key distribution implementation over deployed dark telecom fibers with polarisation-
entangled photons generated at the O-band. One of the photons in the pairs are propagated through 10 km of deployed
fiber while the others are detected locally. Polarisation drifts experienced by the photons propagating through the fibers
are compensated with liquid crystal variable retarders. This ensures continuous and stable QKD operation with an
average QBER of 6.4% and a final key rate of 109 bits/s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two users to
share a common encryption key that is secret to any third
parties. Early QKD protocols such as BB841 were "prepare-
and-measure" schemes, with practical derivatives such as
SARG042 and decoy states3. This was complemented by
the invention of entanglement-based protocols such as E914
and BBM925, with quantitative extensions through device-
independent QKD6. Both types of QKD protocols have been
proven theoretically secure and have been studied extensively
over the decades7–10.
For prepare-and-measure protocols, a trusted random num-
ber generator is required to provide randomness in the state
preparation process. This is not required for entanglement-
based QKD protocols, where randomness of the key origi-
nates from the measurement process itself. Entanglement-
based QKD also does not rely on a true single photon source
or a decoy state mechanism to mitigate a photon number split-
ting attack, and has fewer possible side channels than typical
prepare-send scenarios. As such, entanglement based QKD is
less vulnerable to attacks in practical implementations11.
Both freespace and optical fibre links have been used as
the transmission channel for distributing entangled photon
pairs12. Due to low optical attenuation in the atmosphere, the
channel loss over freespace links can be as low as 0.07 dB/km
at high altitudes13. For protocols using polarisation entan-
glement, the state of the photons is well preserved during
freespace transmission. Early implementations of freespace
QKD used optical telescopes to send and receive photons over
a range14–16, reaching over hundred of kilometers13. Further
more, this range can be extended to thousands of kilometers
by utilizing satellites as intermediate nodes17.
Optical fiber links, on the other hand, are suitable when
a line-of-sight is not available. Fiber-based QKD generally
operates over shorter range (<100 km) due to optical attenu-
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ation of light in the fiber. This is, however, enough to cover
metropolitan areas where a fiber network is available18–21.
The available telecom single mode fiber conforms to the
ITU G.652 standard22. To maximize range, fiber-based QKD
systems can use entangled photons generated at telecom C-
band (1530-1565nm) where fiber absorption is at its mini-
mum (0.2 dB/km)21,23–25. The O-band in (1260-1360nm) is
another choice of wavelength, with an abosrption loss of about
0.32 dB/km. The total loss over fiber transmission in a real-
istic link is always higher due to the presence of splicing and
patching points.
The presence of dispersion effects is another possible lim-
iting factor to the performance of entanglement-based QKD
over fiber. Entangled photon pairs are usually generated via a
Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) process,
which leads to photons of relatively large bandwidth when
performed in nonlinear optical crystals, compared to pho-
tons generated with lasers. Such wideband photons expe-
rience then significant chromatic dispersion in the fiber (∼
18 ps/nm/km at 1550 nm)26. This increases the uncertainty in
timing correlation between the entangled photons, leading to
a lower signal to noise ratio, eventually reducing the final key
rate. The effect of chromatic dispersion can be migitated by
using dispersion-shifted fiber23, or by using entangled pho-
tons at telecom O-band operating on either side of the zero-
dispersion wavelength of the fiber27.
For QKD protocols using polarisation encoding, an optical
fibre cannot be simply regarded as a pure loss channel. When
propagating through the fibre, an arbitrary rotation is applied
to the polarization state of photons and causes basis mismatch.
In addition, fiber Polarisation Mode Dispersion (PMD) can
cause degradation of polarisation entanglement for broadband
photons28,29. Both effects increase the Quantum Bit Error
Rate (QBER), reducing the rate of key generation. While the
polarisation rotation can be compensated30, the presence of
polarisation mode dispersion has led to a preference of time-
bin encoding over polarisation encoding in fiber-based QKD
implementations28,31,32. However in recent years, manufac-
turers are able to make single mode telecom fibers with much
lower PMD value (≤ 0.04ps/√km)26, which makes polari-
sation encoding possible even for relatively broadband entan-
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FIG. 1. (a) Spectrum of the Typr-0 SPDC photons. The black trace
shows the 50 nm bandwidth defined by the bandpass filter applied.
Signal (blue) and idler (red) photons are separated using a wave-
length division demultiplexer. (b) Polarization correlation in both
H/V and D/A bases measured at the entanglement source.
gled photons.
In this work we report an entanglement-based QKD system
implemented over a 10 km deployed fibre in a metropolitan
area. The setup uses the BBM92 protocol5, with polariza-
tion entangled photon pairs generated at telecom O-band to
minimize the effect of chromatic dispersion. The polarisation
rotation due to the fiber is compensated using liquid crystal
variable retarders (LCVRs) after which the polarisation state
is stable during several hours of continuous QKD operation.
II. IMPLEMENTATION
The entangled photon pairs are generated via type-0 SPDC
inside a periodically-poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PP-
KTP) crystal, shown in Fig. 2 (a). The crystal is pumped by a
grating stabilized laser diode at 658 nm, emitting photon pairs
that are degenerate at 1316 nm. The bandwidth of the down-
converted photons is limited to about 50 nm by a bandpass
filter. As shown in Fig. 1 (a), a wavelength division demulti-
plexer with an edge at approximately 1316 nm is used to sep-
arate the signal and idler photons. The entanglement state is
prepared by placing the PPKTP crystal inside a linear beam-
displacement interferometer33. The photon pairs are prepared
in a state:
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FIG. 2. (a) Experimental schematic of the entanglement source. The
pump photons are split to two paths and undergo type-0 SPDC inside
the PPKTP crystal. The polarization state in the lower path is rotated
90 degrees by a half-wave plate. The two paths are then recombined
to create a |Φ+〉 state. (b) QKD setup over 10 km deployed fiber link.
The fiber loops back to the lab to simplify the experimental proce-
dure. The Alice and Bob nodes are run on independent clocks. Al-
ice’s analyzer is connected to the entanglement source via the 10 km
deployed fiber while Bob’s setup is locally connected using a short
patch cord. The two hosting PCs are connected to the same local
area network in order to exchange timestamp data for coincidence
identification.
with polarisation visibility over 98% in both horizontal/vertial
(H/V) and diagonal/anti-diagonal (D/A) bases (Fig. 1 (b)).
With the pump power of 2.4 mW, we observed a local pair
rate of 4300 s−1.
The setup of the QKD system is shown in Fig. 2 (b). The
entangled photon pairs are distributed to two nodes, Alice and
Bob, with a polarisation analyzer placed on each side. A
10 km telecom fiber connects the source to Alice’s analyzer
while Bob’s setup is connected locally via a short patchcord.
The 10 km telecom fiber is deployed underground by Sin-
gapore Telecommunications Limited in a loop configuration
with both ends located at Center for Quantum Technologies,
National University of Singapore. Measurement using an op-
tical time-domain reflectometer (OTDR) shows a total fiber
length of 10.4 km with about -7 dB channel loss (Fig. 3). The
optical absorption of the fiber contributes only about -4 dB to
the total channel loss, with another -3 dB loss due to reflec-
tions at patching points and losses at splicing points. The total
PMD of the fiber link is about 0.1 ps, which is smaller than
the coherence time of the signal and idler photons (∼0.23ps
for 25 nm bandwidth at 1310 nm).
Polarization change due to fiber is compensated by placing
a set of 4 LCVRs before Bob’s analyzer setup. This compen-
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FIG. 3. Optical time-domaine reflectometer trace of the deployed
fibre, identifying a high reflection loss point about 5 km away from
both end points. Two more points with high reflection/absorption
loss are also identified about 100 meters from the end points, which
is due to a 100 meter patching cable between the deployed fiber and
the laboratory setup.
sation only needs to be applied to one of the photons from
each pair to restore the initial |Φ+〉 state after fiber propa-
gation. In some implementations with optical fibers on the
surface30, polarisation compensation needs to be constantly
performed due to the rapid change of the polarization change,
which severely limits the operation continuouity of QKD.
The polarization stability of 10 km deployed fibre in our
setup was characterized by sending in light with well-defined
polarization state across the fiber and monitoring the change
in polarization with a polarimeter34. We find that the output
polarization drift was slow, with a typical 24 h period associ-
ated with day-night temperature change. Once the polariza-
tion rotation is compensated, the fiber allows several hours of
stable QKD operation even without running any active com-
pensation scheme.
Upon receiving the photons, Alice and Bob follow the
BBM92 protocol by measuring polarizations in one of the two
bases: H/V and D/A5. The random detection basis choice is
made by a non-polarizing beam splitter in each setup which
transmits and reflects photons with equal probability35. Four
commercial IndiumGallium Arsenide Avalanche Photodiodes
(InGaAs APDs) are used in each analyzer setup for single
photon detection. The APDs diodes are cooled down to below
-40 ◦C and are operated in freerunning mode with a nominal
detection efficiency around 10% and an average dark count
rate of about 12000 s−1. On each side, detected photons are
timetagged to a resolution of 125 ps with a 4-channel times-
tamping device locked to a rubidium frequency standard36.
Recorded timestamp traces are continuously exchanged
through a network connection between two hosting lab com-
puters. To enable coincidence identification, the clocks on
both sides are synchronized in advance by exploiting the in-
trinsic timing correlations of the SPDC photons37. The un-
certainty in the coincidence time difference is about 1.9 ns
(FWHM) due to fiber chromatic dispersion, detector timing
jitter and other noise in the system27. For coincidence identi-
fication, a coincidence window of 0.5 ns was chosen to opti-
mize the coincidence/accidental ratio without losing too many
coincidence events.
Raw key data are generated after coincidence identifica-
tion and key sifting following a typical BBM92 protocol. Er-
ror correction are then performed on each block of raw key
data accumulated over 25 seconds36 using a modified CAS-
CADE/BICONF algorithm38, following largely39. An esti-
mated QBER is also obtained during error correction and is
used to determine the amount of secure key bits to be extracted
from the raw key bits. Privacy amplification is then performed
on both sides for obtaining the final secure keys40.
We estimate a total system loss of -33dB in our entire QKD
system, with -7dB contributed by the total channel loss of
the deployed fiber, -6dB from the optical coupling loss in the
polarisation compensation and analyzer setup, and another -
20 dB solely due to the detection efficiency of the InGaAs
APDs on both sides. Therefore, detector efficiency is the dom-
inant contribution to the overall system loss in our setup.
III. PERFORMANCE
With the 10 km deployed fiber connected, the rate of de-
tected single photons is 40 699 s−1 on Alice’s analyzer, and
242 125 s−1 at Bob’s side, respectively. We observe a coin-
cidence rate of 670 s−1 and an accidental coincidence rate of
19 s−1. After an initial fiber compensation, the QKD setup
operated continuously over 5.7 hours until one of the detectors
ceased operation due to a temperature overrun. The average
sifted key rate after basis reconciliation is 340 s−1 with an av-
erage estimated QBER of 6.3%. The final key rate after error
correction and privacy amplification is about 109 bits/second
(Fig. 4).
Our final key rate is comparable to other reported
entanglement-based implementations at telecom C-band21, or
at wavelengths detectable by Silicon APDs41. Secure trans-
fer of messages with this key rate is practical using one-
time pad encryption for low bandwidth communications such
as command & control of industrial systems. Alternatively,
the key can be utilized in fast encryption schemes using e.g.
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FIG. 4. QBER (top) and finaly key rate (bottom) logged over
5.7 hours of continuous operation. Error correction and privacy am-
plification are performed over blocks of raw key bits integrated over
25 seconds. Data collection stopped after 5.7 hours due to a detector
failure.
4AES-256, with a much more frequent re-keying compared
to conventional methods20. The key rate in our demonstra-
tion is mainly limited by the low detection efficiency (∼10%)
and high dark count rate (∼ 104 s−1) of the InGaAs APDs
in the setup. Significant increase in key rate is expected
when replacing them with superconducting nanowire detec-
tors (∼80% detection efficiency)42. As practical advantage of
photons at O-band, QKD can operate along the normal inter-
net traffic with all channels in C-band concurrently over the
same fiber link.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated a stable entanglement-based quan-
tum key distribution system operating over a deployed tele-
com fiber of 10 km distance following the BBM92 protocol.
Polarization-entangled photon pairs in the telecom O-band
minimize the effect of chromatic dispersion. The polarisation
change in the fiber due to fiber geometry and birefrincence is
compensated with liquid crystal variable retarders, enabling
stable transmission of photon polarisation states. We operated
the systems continuously for 5.7 hours with an average QBER
of 6.4% and a final key rate of 109 bits/s. The key rate perfor-
mance is mainly limited by the detection efficiencies and high
dark count rate of the InGaAs photodetectors.
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